Safety Relevant Applications at Level Crossings by Means of Imaging Methods by Grimm, Matthias et al.
SAFETY RELEVANT APPLICATIONS AT LEVEL 
CROSSINGS BY MEANS OF IMAGING METHODS 
 
 
Matthias Grimm1, Markus Pelz2, Michael Meyer zu Hörste3 
 
 
Summary: In the past, several attempts were carried out to build up automated 
railway operations using imaging methods. Most attempts were using video-based 
camera technology. However, none of these attempts were implemented in practice. 
To show the possibilities of such a technology, the Institute of Transportation 
Systems (IFS) will build up a demonstration system to analyse the alternatives in 
realising technical protection of level crossings in economical efficient ways without 
decreasing the safety.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 The IFS of the German Aerospace Center (DLR) in Braunschweig 
investigates the situation of secondary lines in present and future in 
Germany. This project is funded by the Ministry of Economics in Lower 
Saxony. In particular, technical and operational solutions, which results in 
cost reducing improvements for the operating company, will be analysed. 
One attempt to increase the economical situation without neglecting safety 
aspects is found in the adoption of imaging methods for safety relevant 
applications in railways. This project is parted in several work packages, 
one is named „Safety relevant applications at the railway system by means 
of imaging methods“. One part of this work package is to find a low cost 
way for a safety level crossing system. An alternative way is to build an 
application by means of imaging methods.  
 The realisation starts with an identification of the technical and 
operational requirements at level crossings and was followed by an analysis 
of the requirement specification for the potential technologies of imaging 
methods. In this contribution it will be discussed in which technical 
characteristics imaging methods are able to involve into the railway system 
without loss in safety. The focus during the analysis phase is focussed in 
existing systems based on imaging methods. 
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1.1. Motivation  
All over Europe there is a multiplicity of technical secured level 
crossings (see fig. 1). Though the chance of an accident at a level crossing 
(LX) according to other accident hotspots is very low, there are numerous 
incidents at LX with very high measures of damages [1]. Furthermore can it 
be said, that as a result of different appearances of the LX road securing 
system the car driver is confronted with a system at LX with very high 
complexity. At this it is not relevant whether the LX is equipped with semi-
barrier or only secured by flash lights, because the car driver will ride over a 
secured LX anyway without any attention to the trackside of the LX. 
In this contribution it will be shown, how a LX can be designed 
with more performance for the LX securing system, when the roadside is 
included in the whole system design. 
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Fig.1. Level crossing with half barrier and light signal 
 
 
1.2. Performance vs. safety  
 In many countries, LX on less important roads and railway lines 
are often open or uncontrolled, sometimes with warning lights or bells to 
warn the car driver of approaching trains. LX without barriers represents a 
safety issue. Many accidents have occurred due to failure to notice or obey 
the warning.  
 In the German Allgemeines Eisenbahn Gesetz (AEG) it is said that 
"Railways in Germany are obliged, to build their vehicles and 
infrastructures in a safe way and to keep them in a safe state." [2]  
 To reach this requirement, it is common practice, to learn out of 
dangerous situations, incidents and accidents to identify weak spots of a 
system and eliminate them. This contribution shows how the system safety 
of a complex structure like a LX can be increased by the use of non-
common methods. This could in future lead to the development of a newly 
LX securing system. 
 In rail traffic it is necessary to take special technical and 
operational measures for realising reliable and safe rail operations, because 
of the longer braking distances in comparison to rail traffic and the missing 
possibility of a train to avoid. Such measures are resulting in higher 
operational costs, although the railway operators are under increasing cost 
pressures.  
 In Europe a lot of LX systems are secured for the road traffic only 
by a LX warning sign (see fig. 2). This is not really performed to the 
operation and to the safety in railways. Additional there is no system, which 
allowed the train driver to react in urgent cases of a dangerous situation. 
 
Fig.2. Level crossing without barrier and light signal 
 
 
1.3. Expansive technology vs. Economic interests 
 Because of system inherent features of the railway, trackside 
equipment is exposed to high stress resulting out of climate, vibration and 
electromagnetic radiation. Thereby, maintenance works with high financial 
and personnel efforts are resulting. The initial cost of a system that that 
resists these circumstances is very high at the moment, so that the investor 
avoids such a capital expenditure for LX systems. 
 One step for lowering the costs is the reduction of cabling. 
Furthermore it is to check, whether highly available low-cost technology 
can lead to a reduction of existing safety components, like expensive 
vacancy proving system for the danger zone of a LX. The relocation of 
technology from the track to the on-board side can be seen as one possible 
way to get a cost minimisation, because special maintenance services do not 
need to take place, due to periodic vehicle maintenance and to reach a 
adaptively of the equipment to the volume of traffic. 
 
 
2. Today’s Systems 
2.1. State of the art 
 Today some technical systems based on video technology is 
involved in the operational process of the German railway system, 
especially for the operator to watch the danger zone (see fig. 3 a).  
 In Hamburg, Germany, a video based system is in use by the 
Hamburg commuter railway system. The train driver obtains part of the 
information required for the train dispatching procedure by means of 
wireless video transmission. Information about what is happening on the 
platform is transmitted from the cameras installed on the platform to the 
monitors in the driver cab (see fig. 3 b) [3]. 
 
Fig.3. a. Video system at level crossing with full barrier and  
 b. Driver-dispatch system of the Hamburg commuter railway system 
 
 
2.2. Innovative approach 
 In general, special signals are given to the train driver by the 
interlocking, if a LX flash light system is faulty. This linking between 
interlocking and train is highly expensive and forms the main part of the 
total costs of a LX, though used only a few times in a year. This is why 
infrastructural technology should be turned down, especially on low 
frequented lines. 
 Therefore, in the Switzerland an innovative system is under test, 
which secures a LX only by flash light in combination with a dynamic road 
sign instead of expensive barriers (see fig. 4). The road sign will flash 
yellow in case of a fault in the flash lights of the LX and the crossing of the 
tracks is on own risk because the train driver does not know if the LX flash 
light is in operation or is faulty. 
 
Fig.4. An innovative LX system with light signal at Emmental [4] 
 
 
3. Imaging based concept 
 The answer of the above mentioned problem could be seen in low 
cost technologies like imaging methods. For realising a LX securing system, 
modern imaging methods by using cameras in visible an infrared range are 
investigated. These sensors will be installed in such a way, that an 
automatically detection of the road traffic (e.g. pedestrians, bicycles, cars, 
etc.) and by this an activation of the LX control can be realised. 
The following functions shall be achieved by such a method to implement 
efficient and cost optimised rail operations, especially on secondary lines: 
− safe technology with higher efficiency 
− extension of existing safety concepts and technology to reach better 
performance 
− safety optimisation 
− minimisation of harms 
− cabling reduction 
− safe low cost vacancy proving of LX danger zone 
Several applications can be found in the field of railways and especially in 
the area of level crossings, e.g. the vacancy proving of the danger zone or 
the transmission of live video streams from the LX to the rail vehicle.  
Regarding to this contribution, only the methods for performing a vacancy 
proving of the danger zone of a LX is shown in detail.  
3.1. The Janus Head algorithm 
 The imaging based sensor technology is mounted at the LX 
warning sign (see fig. 5). It reduces the costs by disclaiming of earth 
moving. The construction of this camera system is called Janus Head, which 
means that the sensor system, consisting of two cameras, is able to view in 
two different directions. One camera system means two camera sensors 
(visible and infrared range); a Janus Head camera system itself consists of 
two camera systems (see fig. 5).  
 
Fig.5. Imaging based sensor application at LX 
 To perform a vacancy proving of the LX danger zone requires a 
safe detection of every obstacle in the danger zone. The Janus Head system 
use the fact, that an obstacle like a vehicle first must approach the LX from 
the road side before it can enter the danger zone. The approaching traffic 
can be detected by the used method. In a next step an algorithm can perform 
a vacancy proving for the danger zone by generating expectation values, 
which were communicated between the sensor systems and the system 
algorithms respectively. 
 The example which is discussed in this contibution, can include the 
follwing action sequence (see fig. 6): 
− Camera 1 detects a vehicle and safes a picture of the frontside of 
the vehicle (see fig. 7 – C1) and sends a message to the LX that a 
vehicle is approaching. 
− Camera 1 sends the picture as an expactation value to camera 3 and 
activates camera 2 to expect a vehicle. 
− Camera 3 detects a vehicle with the expected value (see fig. 7 – 
C3) and sends a warning to the LX that the danger zone is blocked 
by a vehicle. 
− Camera 2 detects a vehicle and safes a picture of the backside of 
the vehicle (see fig. 7 – C2) and sends a warning to the LX that the 
danger zone is blocked by a vehicle. 
− Camera 2 sends the picture as an expactation value to camera 4. 
− Camera 4 detects a vehicle with the expected value (see fig. 7 – 
C4) and sends a message to the LX that the obstacle has left the 
danger zone and that the LX is free again.  
Camera System 1 Camera System 2 Camera System 3 Camera System 4
Expectation value approaching Vehicle
Expectation value leaving Vehicle
Obstacle in the danger zone
Obstacle left the danger zone
Expect Vehicle
No Obstacle on LX  [LX free]
Vehicle approaching LX
Obstacle on LX  [LX blocked]
Vehicle detected - Backside
Vehicle detected - Frontside
Vehicle detected - Backside
No Obstacle on LX  [LX free]
Vehicle detected - Frontside()
Obstacle in danger zone
Obstacle on LX  [LX blocked]
 
Fig.6. Sequence of obstacle detection in the LX danger zone 
 
Fig.7. View from the imaging based sensor 
 If the system is not able to generate a doubtless vacancy proving 
detection of the danger zone, the LX will be signalled as not secured. By 
this a misleadingly as free signalled LX can be avoided. 
 
 
3.2. Demonstration 
 Because of a wide operational area of such a method, it is 
necessary to perform realistic tests. Especially with regards to the safety 
criticality of such an application, first tests will be done in a non-public area 
where only SIL 2 (SIL = “Safety Integrity Level”) system is required. 
 For the field tests, a road-rail vehicle and a minivan will be used, in 
the first steps. After an initial phase of tests, a demonstration unit will be 
developed, that can be mounted at an LX in the above mentioned non-
public area.  
 
 
4. Conclusion  
 The implementation of imaging methods using camera based 
technology can help increasing the safety of railways especially at level 
crossings. To implement such an innovative system, intensive test 
campaigns are necessary in which the multiple requirements regarding 
safety targets, availability, maintainability and security can be evaluated.  
 Innovative systems using camera based technology form an 
economical advantageous alternative to existing track-fixed monitoring 
units still reaching the required safety regulations formulated by standard 
books, laws or other official documents all over Europe. 
 The Institute of Transportation Systems of the German Aerospace 
Center in Braunschweig will develop such a system and evaluates it in 
different field tests. First results could be presented in the next year. 
 
 
5. References 
1. Dieter Ellinghaus, Jürgen Steinbrecher: Das Kreuz mit dem 
Andreakreuz, Continental AG, Hannover, 2006 
2. Allgemeines Eisenbahn Gesetz (AEG) 
3. Bernhard Mrochen: Zugselbstabfertigung durch den Triebwagenführer 
bei der Hamburger S-Bahn, SIGNAL + DRAHT, 4/2002 
4. Bruno Zürcher: Ungesicherte Bahnübergänge mit wenig Geld 
verbessern, www.Wochen-Zeitung.ch, 05.10.2006 
